We study whether capital market frictions impact firms' investment in workplace safety.
Introduction
The real impact of financial market development on macroeconomic activities has drawn considerable academic attention from financial economists. Prior studies find that financial development causes economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996) and improves capital allocation (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Wurgler, 2000) . More recent work shows that the financial market also influences micro level decisions such as corporate investment (Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein, 2012) . However, relatively little is known about whether frictions in the capital market affect firms' investment in human capital. This paper attempts to shed light on this issue.
Human capital is becoming an increasingly important factor in the U.S. as it transforms into a more knowledge-based economy. In fact, the amount U.S. businesses spend on payroll dwarfs that spent on capital expenditures ($6.3 trillion versus $1.6 trillion), according to 2015 Statistics of U.S. Businesses. 1 One challenge in this strand of research is that it is difficult to measure human capital investment directly. Direct investment in human capital such as training is often only available at the aggregated industry level. We circumvent this issue by focusing on firms' investment in workplace safety. Specifically, we utilize the establishment-level workplace injury data from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)'s data initiative program (ODI). 2 Investing in workplace safety represents an important form of human capital investment with direct implications for employee welfare and firms' competitive position.
To measure capital market frictions, we concentrate on the aspect of short selling,
an important yet contentious issue. Proponents argue that short selling allows for efficient price discovery and mitigating price bubbles, 3 but critics contend that short selling plays a detrimental role to the capital market by driving up stock market volatility and adversely affecting stock prices. 4 While this debate is ongoing and still largely unsettled, it is important to recognize short selling activities do not occur randomly and reflect endogenous choices by traders. This identification challenge makes it difficult to identify any causal effect of short selling on corporate behavior.
We get around this problem by exploiting a randomized experiment -Regulation SHO. In July 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced a new regulation governing short-selling activities of a randomly selected sample of U.S. stocks.
Specifically, every third one of the stocks in the Russell 3000 index ranked by trading volume was chosen to enter a Rule 202T pilot program (pilot program hereafter). Stocks selected into the pilot program were exempt from short-sale price tests 5 between May 2, 2005 and August 6, 2007 . This experiment provides an ideal setting for our tests because the relaxation of the short selling constraints is not perfectly correlated with actual short selling activities, and only represents an expected increase in the probability for the pilot firms to be shorted.
From a theoretical perspective, the impact of this increase in short selling pressure on investment in workplace safety is ambiguous. On one hand, the increased short selling pressure could serve as a disciplinary mechanism by increasing managers' incentives to 3 https://www.ft.com/content/cb22ac84-3cdb-11e0-bbff-00144feabdc0 investment in workplace safety. Traditional theories on quiet life (i.e., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) suggest that absent takeover pressure and effective monitoring, managers shirk and exert too little effort, underinvesting in cognitively complicated tasks such as workplace safety. By intensifying potential monitoring by outside investors -in this case short selling investors, the increase in short selling pressure due to the removal of short selling constraints should lead to greater investment in workplace safety and lower injury rates. We term this the Managerial Disciplinary Hypothesis.
In direct contrast, critics argue that short selling plays a detrimental role to the capital market by driving up stock market volatility and adversely affecting stock prices.
In recent theoretical work, Goldstein and Guembel (2008) argue that sudden changes in stock prices can distort managers' investment decisions by undermining managers' ability to learn from their firms' stock prices. This provides incentives for bear raiders to manipulate firms' investment decisions through exerting pressure on their stock prices.
We therefore posit that with an increase in short selling pressure, managers might adopt a more myopic perspective by shifting their attention to more short-term focused activities and away from non-salient, long-term investments such as those in workplace safety, resulting in higher injury rates. We call this the Performance Pressure Hypothesis.
To test these competing hypotheses, we match accounting data from public firms to safety data from OSHA's ODI program and construct a panel of approximately 17,000 establishment-year observations from 2002 to 2008. For our tests, we utilize a differencein-difference research design in which the treatment and control firms consist of the pilot firms exempt from the short selling constraint and the non-pilot firms for which the shortselling rules remain in place, respectively. We find that firms that are exempt from the price tests (pilot firms) experience a significant 17.5% (1.481/8.439) to 21.7% (1.833/8.439) increase in workplace injury rates relative to the sample mean during the experiment period. This result holds after controlling for several firm-level characteristics as well as establishment-level factors, such as labor intensity, seasonality in production activities, and union strikes.
Our second set of tests examines whether the impact of the removal of the short selling constraints on injury rates varies in the cross section in ways consistent with short selling creating an excessive pressure for managers to become short-term oriented.
Specifically, we expect the negative impact of short selling on firms' investment in workplace safety to be stronger in the following scenarios: (i) when firms are experiencing stiff competition from the product market, (ii) when firms' corporate governance infrastructure is poor, (iii) when firms are financially constrained, and (iv) when employees' bargaining power with management is low or when labor is an unimportant input in the production process. Consistent with these predictions, we find that the increase in injury rates (i.e., decrease in investment in workplace safety) is greater for firms that with low text-based HHI, high Total Similarity (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016) and high product fluidity (Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala, 2014) , for firms with poor corporate governance as proxied by institutional ownership, board independence, and G-index, and for firms that are more financially constrained. We also find the effect to be more pronounced among firms with low union membership and labor intensity.
Although there is strong evidence that the Rule 202T pilot program is completely random, we still want to rule out the possibility that our main effects are simply artifact of some underlying time-varying omitted variables. To this end, we randomly assign firms into placebo treatments and re-estimate our main specification. Overall, we find no discernable differences in injury rates between pseudo treatment and control firms, which suggests that our documented impact of the pilot program on injury rates is unlikely to be the result of differential time trends or some omitted variables, but rather due to the actual policy experiment. This paper contributes primarily to two stands of literature. First, by studying the impact of short selling constraints, this paper contributes to a large literature on capital market friction and real economic activity. Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston (2015) find that the removal of short-sale constraints leads to reductions in equity issuance and capital expenditures, especially for small firms that have high levels of financial constraints. Fang, Huang, and Karpoff (2016) find decreased levels of discretionary accruals for pilot firms when the price tests are removed, suggesting that increased monitoring activities by short sellers, along with reduced short-selling costs, demotivate managers to manage earnings.
He and Tian (2016) find that pilot firms experience large increases in corporate innovation indicated by patenting activities, highlighting a reduction in managers' tendency to focus on short-term goals at the expense of long-term, value-increasing projects (managerial myopia). Recent work by Angelis, Grullon, and Michenaud (2017) finds that pilot firms grant more stock options to CEOs than restricted shares and adopt anti-takeover provisions during the pilot period. They explain that higher convexity of CEO compensation payoffs driven by such changes in the incentive design can mitigate managers' career concerns caused by short-selling threats, since it reduces managers' downside risk and motivates managers to undertake risky projects Our paper extends this literature by documenting that short-selling has an unintended consequence on firms' investment in its workplace safety. In theory, removing short selling constraints is an important step towards establishing a more frictionless and healthier financial market, but it may have unintended consequences on firms' incentives to invest in workplace safety.
By focusing on workplace safety as our primary outcome of interest, we also join an interdisciplinary field that is at the conjunction of management, law, and health economics.
Workplace has drawn attention from financial economists only recently. Several papers document that determinants of workplace safety include leverage (e.g., Cohn and Wardlaw, 2016; Filer and Golbe, 2003; Nie and Zhao, 2015) , analysts' forecast pressure (Caskey and Ozel, 2017) , and private equity buyouts (Cohn, Nestoriak, and Wardlaw, 2017) . We expand our understanding of workplace safety and more broadly firms' investment in worker welfare by documenting a causal relationship between short selling constraint and workplace injury rates. Our evidence suggests that financial market frictions and corporate behavior in general are closely related and should be considered perhaps jointly in policy formulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical link between short selling and investment in workplace safety. Section 3 describes our empirical methodology and data. Section 4 reports the empirical results, and we conclude with Section 5.
Link between Short Selling & Investment in Workplace Safety
Why would short selling pressure affect firms' investment in workplace safety? One explanation is that the increase in short selling pressure could discipline managers so as to encourage them to increase investment in workplace safety. This explanation follows from the notion that that managers who enjoy quiet life will likely underinvest in cognitively difficult tasks as such as workplace safety. For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) document an increase in worker pay and a reduction in plant opening and destruction activities after corporate governance worsens. The authors term this the quiet life hypothesis, which states that absent effective monitoring, managers like to enjoy "doing nothing" by staying away from cognitively difficult tasks. Following this logic, by serving as a monitoring device, the sudden increase in short selling pressure could lead to a greater investment in workplace safety. We term this the Disciplinary Hypothesis and summarize it as follows: Alternatively, an increase in short selling pressure could also lead to a decrease in investment in workplace safety. Short selling is often associated with large, sudden downward movements in stock prices. In the theoretical framework of Goldstein and Guembel (2008) , such exogenous changes in stock prices lead to cancellation of positive net present value projects because of the undermined learning channel. In addition, bear raiders, who can be competitors or other interested parties that could benefit from a firm's rapidly declining stock price, have incentives to further drive down a firm's stock prices to distort its real investment decisions. An increase in short selling pressure might therefore induce managers to shift their attention to more short-term focused activities. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2015) find that in a survey of approximately 400 U.S. Chief Financial Officers (CFOs), over three quarters (78%) are willing to sacrifice long-term activities in order to satisfy short-term performance pressure. These arguments directly lead to our alternative Performance Pressure Hypothesis stated below: Importantly for our purpose, this policy was adopted on a randomly selected sample of stocks (i.e., pilot firms), which are similar to those that are not selected (i.e., non-pilot firms) in terms of their observable firm-level characteristics. In fact, Panel C of Table 1 compares the mean value of pilot and non-pilot firms across a range of different firm-level characteristics. It shows that with the exception of free cash flow 6 , all other dimensions are similar across the two groups of firms, providing further support for the random nature of the sample selection of the policy experiment.
Empirical Methodology
To examine the effect of short selling on firms' investment in workplace safety, we adopt a difference-in-differences research design and estimate the following panel regression model: X is a set of establishment-level and firm-level control variables measured at t. We include a combination of establishment, firm, and/or industry fixed effects. The establishment and firm fixed effects control for any time-invariant characteristics at the establishment and firm levels, respectively.
In Equation (1), 1 α captures any inherent differences in injury rates between pilot and non-pilot firms. 2 α measures the time trends in injury rates during the period the pilot program is implemented. Our main coefficient of interest is 3 α , which tells us how the pilot firms' injury rates differentially change relative to the non-pilot firms during the experiment period. 7
To correct for heteroskedasticity and correlation of standard errors within firms, we cluster standard errors at the firm level. Given that variation in the short selling is at the firm level, this clustering method accounts for potential time-varying correlations in unobserved factors that affect different establishments within a given firm (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004) . This methodology also corrects for within-establishment error term correlations over time and is therefore more general than establishment-level clustering.
Sample Selection

A. Workplace Safety Data
Our primary source for workplace safety data comes from Occupational Safety and While the injury data from OSHA provides names of the reporting establishments and their parent companies, it does not come with a unique firm-level identifier. 11 We thus perform an extensive fuzzy matching based on name and address. For cases which the fuzzy matching is unable to identify, we manually search on Google, firms' annual reports (10K), and other sources to complement this process. With this procedure, we are able to match roughly 78,000 establishment-year observations belonging to 4,357 unique public firms. This rate is comparable to that reported in Cohn and Wardlaw (2016) and validates our matching procedure.
B. Analytical Sample
From this initially matched sample, we exclude regulated industries such as utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) 12 and financial (SIC codes 6000-6999) firms. 13 We also require that these firms have non-missing data for total assets, leverage, sales, capital expenditure, and 11 OSHA data does not contain all private sector employers in all years. For example, the OSHA data for 2010 is not available for the following six states that did not participate in the ODI: Alaska, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Washington, and Wyoming. Our inclusion of establishment fixed effects mitigates this issue by controlling for time-invariant factors that could influence workplace safety within a given establishment. 12 Our results remain intact when we include these regulated firms. 13 This means that for an establishment with 100 full-time employees working for a total of 40 hours per week and 50 weeks a year (i.e., 200,000 hours in total), there are average 8.44
injury incidents. Panel B shows that the average total assets for firms in the sample is around $33 billion, which is higher than the average value obtained for a typical Compustat firm. As mentioned previously, when we break the data into subsamples of establishmentyear observations that belong to pilot firms and non-pilot firms in Panel C, we find that pilot firms and non-pilot firms exhibit similar averages for all the variables, which further validates the assumption of random assignment for the Reg SHO policy experiment.
Empirical Results
Baseline Regression
We first estimate Equation (1) to examine the impact of Regulation SHO on investment in workplace safety. Column 1 regresses the total case rates on indicator variables for whether the establishment belongs to a pilot firm, whether it is during the policy experiments, and the interaction between the two dummies. The results show a positive and significant coefficient of 1.573 on the interaction term of Pilot and During, which suggests that during the experiment period, injury rates at establishments belonging to pilot firms increase by 18.6% (1.573/8.439) of the sample mean. This effect is quite sizeable economically.
Column 2 further controls an array of firm level variables including size, capital structure, asset tangibility, asset turnover, capital investment, investment opportunity, free cash flow, cash holdings, and the payout ratio. injury rates at an average pilot firm's establishment increases by 0.0028/hour to 0.0030/hour more than those non-pilot firms during the experiment period.
In Columns 4 and 5, we impose more stringent requirement on the data by including firm fixed effects and establishment fixed effects, respectively. In both cases, the Pilot term drops out because it is absorbed by the fixed effects. Overall, even in the most rigorous empirical specification, Column 5, which accounts for any time-invariant establishmentlevel characteristics, we continue to observe a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term. Importantly, the economic magnitude remains relatively stable.
Cross Sectional Regressions
In this section, we examine how the impact of Reg SHO on firms' investment on workplace safety varies in the cross section. Specifically, we focus on external or internal factors that either influence firms' willingness or ability to invest in such workplace safety.
Product Market Competition
If increased short selling pressure makes managers more myopic as to cut their investment in workplace safety, we expect this effect to be particularly strong if managers are also facing competitive pressure in the product market. Product market competition is long recognized as an important disciplinary mechanism for corporate managers by constantly forcing them to improve efficiency and reduce slack (Hicks, 1935; Smith, 1776; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989; Giroud and Mueller, 2004) , but it also leaves less flexibility in managers' everyday decision making by imposing an additional constraint. We therefore hypothesize that the effect of short selling pressure on firms' investment in workplace safety is particularly strong for firms for which product market threats are high.
To measure the degree of competition, we employ three recently developed measures using textual analysis. The first two measures, Product Market HHI and Product Market Similarity are developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2016) . Different from traditional metrics, these measures are based on industry classification based on each firm's product language description and are firm-specific. HHI and Similarity are positively and negatively related to firms' pricing power, respectively. The third measure, Product Market Fluidity, developed in Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) , captures the changes in rival firms' products relative to the firm's products, and is intended to measure the severity of product market threats a given firm faces. We classify firms into above-and below-median groups based on their measure of product market competitiveness and conduct subsample analyses. For instance, in the case of HHI, we first find each two-digit SIC industry's median HHI prior to the RegSHO experiment. This approach has the advantage of not confounding any changes in industry structure during the experiment period. We then divide firms into High HHI and Low HHI groups if their respective measures are higher or lower than the industry median measure, respectively. We follow an analogous approach for the other two measures. 
Labor Characteristics
Since our primary outcome of interest is firms' investment in workplace safety, which is a direct measure of employee welfare, we examine how pre-existing conditions in the labor market shape the impact of the short selling pressure and present the results of this analysis in Table 4 . Specifically, we employ four variables that measure various aspects of the labor market condition. First, Union Membership and Bargain Agreement Coverage, are state-level variables that attempt to capture the relative power of labor in their negotiation with the management. Unionized employees through organized collective effort can bargain more effectively and obtain concessions from firms (e.g., Lindbeck and Snower, 1986 , 1987 , 2001 ). We once again divide our sample into establishment-year observations that have above-or below-median values of these variables and estimate our baseline regressions in each subsample. Columns 1 to 4 show that the increase in injury rates is only present at establishments with relatively low union membership and bargain agreement coverage. This is consistent with the notion that managers at establishments where labor has little negotiating power cut corners more in employment safety.
Second, we also exploit Labor Intensity, which measures the importance of labor input in the production process. We expect that all other things equal, managers might find it imperative to invest more in workplace safety if workers play a crucial role in the production function. We again perform subsample analyses. Overall, we find evidence consistent with our prediction: the increase in injury rates for pilot firms' establishments is most pronounced in industries of high labor intensity. Taken together, these results suggest that the influence of increased short selling pressure on investment in workplace safety is largely dependent on employees' bargaining position with management, as the increase in injury rates is only observed in subsamples in which employees are at a relative disadvantage compared to management.
Financial Constraints
In Table 5 , we investigate whether firms' financial condition influences the level of investment in workplace safety during the pilot period. We posit that, holding all else equal, firms that are more financially constrained will be more likely to cut corners in employee safety when facing increased short selling pressure.
To measure firms' financial constraints, we employ three widely used indexes developed by Whited and Wu (2006) (WW), Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (KZ), and Hadlock and Pierce (2010) (SA). We again estimate our baseline regression in the subsamples of high versus low financial constraints. Across all three measures of financial constraints, we find that only establishments belonging to pilot firms that are financially constrained experience increases in injury rates, but not those in non-constrained firms. With the exception of KZ index, the difference in the increase in injury rates for financially constrained and non-constrained firms is economically large and statistically significant. This is consistent with early papers documenting that workplace safety is negatively correlated with high financial constraints (Cohn and Wardlaw, 2016) .
Corporate Governance
Although investment in workplace safety is long-term beneficial, it is largely unobservable to an average investor. To the extent that better shareholder monitoring and better corporate governance can alleviate managerial short-termism and encourage them to focus more on long term growth (Edmans, 2009) , we expect firms with better external and internal monitoring mechanism are less likely to cut down investment in employment safety.
To test this conjecture, we employ four measures of monitoring and corporate governance. Our first measure is Institutional Ownership, which we obtain from 13F filings.
It has long been documented that large stakeholders exert more monitoring effort and is an effective disciplinary force (Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997) . Consistent with our prediction, we find that the increase in injury rates at pilot firms during the experiment period only occurs in firms with low institutional ownership. The second measure we employ is % of IndBoard, the percentage of independent directors. Once again, we find an increase in injury rates to only exist in firms with below-median board independence. The two final measures are metrics of overall corporate governance -G-index as developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and E-index as developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008) . Once again, we find that poorly governed pilot firms, as measured by high values of G-index and E-index, experience a greater increase in injury rates during the experiment period. Take the E-index, for example, the coefficient estimate on , , j t s t
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for high E-index firms is almost 8 times as large as that for low E-index firms.
The cross-sectional tests in this section are important to rule out alternative stories that could confound our main findings so far. In general, interaction terms are less prone to an omitted variables bias. For an omitted variable to explain the following crosssectional results, it would have to be correlated with all of the characteristics for which we find cross-sectional variation in the relation between short selling pressure and injury rates.
Placebo Tests
While our results so far suggest that firms experiencing an increase in short selling pressure cut their investment in workplace safety, there is still a potential concern that some underlying omitted variables are driving our results. We therefore perform two types of falsification tests. In the first type of falsification test, we keep the experiment period unchanged but randomly select firms that may or may not have been selected as the actual pilot firms. Our second type of placebo treatments keeps the set of pilot firms unchanged but randomly assigns them to different treatment periods. The first falsification test attempts to address the concern that our results might not be due to the removal of short selling constraints, but rather is attributable to some other unobservable characteristics.
The second falsification test, on the other hand, deals with the possibility that our documented results are due to time trends that are causing the pilot firms to behave in a certain way.
We present results of these analyses in 
Decomposition of Workplace Safety
In this section, we try to further investigate in-depth the different types of safety investment changes in response to the short selling pressure. Specifically, we examine whether managers, when faced with short-selling pressure, change their behavior so as to focus on more performance-related investment. To this end, we first regress total case rate, our main dependent variable, on several measures of operational performance and value including ROA, Market Value, and Market-to-book Ratio. From this first-stage regression, we obtain the fitted value, which we call y-hat. Conceptually, this represents the portion of injury rates that can be explained by the above performance measures. We also obtain the residuals from these first-stage regressions and denote them -hat, which is the portion of injury rates that cannot be explained by the performance-related metrics.
Next, we re-estimate our main specification by separately using y-hat and -hat as the outcome variable. 
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are statistically significant at least at the 10% significance level. More importantly, the economic magnitude remains quite stable and large in size, suggesting that most of the increases in injury rates are indeed unrelated to firm performance. In contrast, Column 4 through 6 shows that performance-related injury rates do not exhibit any changes, and the coefficient estimates on the interaction term are close to zero and several times smaller compared to those in Columns 1 to 3.
Other Tests
In this section, we perform a series of other tests to check the robustness of our main finding. We first examine whether increases in pilot firms' injury rates experience a reversal in the aftermath of the policy experiment. 
Pilot Durinǵ
. As is shown in Table 9 , this interaction term is also positive and statistically significant, suggesting that there is a prolonged effect of the pilot program on pilot firms' investment in workplace safety.
Next, we re-estimate the impact of the policy experiment employing alternative regression specification models as well as alternative definition of workplace injury rates. Overall, we find similar results as our main finding that pilot firms experience a significant increase in injury rates during the experiment period. In Table 11 , we use the next year's injury rate with days away, restricted, or transferred (DART) and the next year's injury rate with days away from work (DAFWII) as dependent variables and find a similar effect from the Reg SHO experiment on these alternative measures of injury rates.
Conclusion
Using Reg SHO as a natural experiment that removes short selling constraints for a randomly selected set of firms, we examine its impact on firms' investment in human capital as captured by workplace safety. We find strong and robust evidence that the removal of the short selling pressure leads firms to underinvest in workplace safety, which results in a significant increase in injury rates.
We also document that this effect is particularly pronounced for firms that face stiff product market competition, have poor internal and external monitoring mechanisms, are financially constrained, and have poor labor rights relative to management. We further find that while we observe a significant reduction in workplace safety investment in nonperformance related areas, no change is discernable in performance-related safety investment.
Our paper provides some of the first micro-level evidence on how frictions in the capital market can exert an influence on firms' investment in their human capital as captured in workplace safety. This unintended consequence of short selling threats has important policy implications, as it suggests that any policies intended to advance the financial market towards a more frictionless world may produce serious side effects on firms' overall investment behavior. 
PPE/Assets
Firm's net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets.
Sales/Assets
Firm's total sales divided by total assets.
CAPEX/Assets
Firm's capital expenditure divided by total assets.
Market-to-Book
Firm's market value of assets divided by book value of assets. Market value of assets equals the sum of market value of equity, book value of total liabilities, and liquidation value of preferred stock minus deferred tax liabilities.
FCF/Assets
Firm's total free cash flows divided by total assets, which equals (oibdq-xint-txdi-capx)/at.
Cash/Assets
Firm's cash and short-term investments divided by total assets.
Dividends/Assets
Firm's total cash dividends paid to common shares divided by total assets. 
KZ Index
An index introduced by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) .
It is calculated as -1.002*cash flow + 0.283 * Tobin Q + 3.189 * leverage -39.368 * dividends -1.315 * cash holding.
WW Index
An index introduced by Whited and Wu (2006) . It is calculated as -0.091*(income before extraordinary items + depreciation and amortization)/total assets -0.062*(indicator set to one if the sum of common dividends and preferred dividends is positive, and zero otherwise) + 0.021*leverage -0.044*Ln(assets) + 0.102*average industry sales -0.035*sales growth.
SA Index
An index introduced by Hadlock and Pierce (2010), calculated as 0.737* size + 0.043*size 2 -0.040*age, where size is log of total book assets, and age is number of years listed from Compustat.
Market Value
Year end market value of equity, calculated by yearend price and year-end shares outstanding from CRSP.
Inst.Ownership
Percentage of shares held by institutional investors, averaged over the four quarters in a year.
G-Index
Governance index combining 24 provisions, introduced by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) .
E-Index
Index of six shareholder rights introduced by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009 DART is the number of injuries and illnesses with days away from work and with job restriction or transfer divided by the number of hours worked by all employees in a given establishmentyear, then multiplied by 200,000; DAFWII is the number of injuries and illnesses with days away from work divided by the number of hours worked by all employees in a given establishment-year, then multiplied by 200,000; Total Case is the number of injuries and illnesses divided by the number of hours worked by all employees in a given establishment-year, then multiplied by 200,000. Variables that are on firm level are defined as following: Assets is total assets (in $billions) at a fiscal year end; Sales is total sales (in $billions) in a fiscal year; Leverage is total short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets at a fiscal year end; Market-to-Book is market value of assets divided by book value of assets at a fiscal year end; PPE/Assets is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets; CAPEX/Assets is capital expenditure divided by total assets; FCF/Assets is total free cash flows divided by total assets; Cash/Assets is cash and short-term investments divided by total assets; Dividends/Assets is total cash dividends paid to common shares divided by total assets. Variables that are on establishment-level are defined as following: No. of Employee (in 000s) is total number of employees working in a given establishment during the year; Hours Per Employee (in 000s) is total number of annual hours worked in a given establishment divided by the number of employees; Strike is an indicator variable equal to one if there was a strike in the establishment during the year, and zero otherwise; Shutdown is an indicator variable equal to one if there was a shutdown in the establishment during the year, and zero otherwise; Seasonal is an indicator variable equal to the establishment employs seasonal workers, and zero otherwise; Disaster is an indicator variable equal to one if the establishment is affected by adverse weather conditions or natural disasters during the year, and zero otherwise. 2002-2008 (excluding 2005 ) that belong to non-financial and non-utility firms. The subsamples are defined based on product market metrics. One firm is defined as in "Low" Product Market HHI group if in the pre-RegSHO period, the firm is in an industry with lower than pre-RegSHO period's sample median of Product Market HHI, where industry is based on two-digit SIC codes; otherwise, a firm is defined as in "High" Product Market HHI group. Same token applies to Product Market Similarity and Product Market. Definitions of other variables are in the Appendix Table A . P-values based on robust standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 2002-2008 (excluding 2005 ) that belong to non-financial and non-utility firms. The subsamples are defined based on labor and labor market conditions. One firm is defined as in "Low" Union Membership group if in the pre-RegSHO period, the firm is in an industry with lower than pre-RegSHO period's sample median of Union Membership, where industry is based on two-digit SIC codes; otherwise, a firm is defined as in "High" Union Membership group. Same token applies to Bargain Agreement Coverage, and Labor Intensity. We include all the firm-and establishment-specific variables as those in Table 2 , however not report below for brevity. Definitions of other variables are in the Appendix 2002-2008 (excluding 2005 ) that belong to non-financial and non-utility firms. The subsamples are defined based on firm financial constraints. One firm is defined as in "Low" WW Index group if in the pre-RegSHO period, the firm's WW Index is lower than pre-RegSHO period's sample median of WW Index; otherwise, a firm is defined as in "High" WW Index group. Same token applies to KZ Index and SA Index. We include all the firm-and establishment-specific variables as those in Table 2 , however not report below for brevity. Definitions of other variables are in the Appendix 2002-2008 (excluding 2005 ) that belong to non-financial and non-utility firms. The subsamples are defined based on firm corporate governance metrics. One firm is defined as in "Low" Inst.Ownership group if in the pre-RegSHO period, the firm's Inst.Ownership is lower than pre-RegSHO period's sample median of Inst.Ownership; otherwise, a firm is defined as in "High" Inst.Ownership group. Same token applies to % of IndBoard, G-Index and E-Index. We include all the firm-and establishment-specific variables as those in Table  2 , however not report below for brevity. Definitions of other variables are in the Appendix (i.e. 2001 to 2003) . We include all the firm-and establishment-specific variables as those in Table 2 , however not report below for brevity. Definitions of other variables are in the Appendix Table A . P-values based on robust standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Product Market HHI Product Market Similarity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 2002-2008 (excluding 2005 ) that belong to non-financial and non-utility firms.
In Column (1) -(3), the dependent variable is the next year's injury rate with days away, restricted, or transferred (DART), which is the number of injuries and illnesses with days away from work and with job restriction or transfer divided by the number of hours worked by all employees in a given establishment-year, then multiplied by 200,000. In Column (4) -(6), the dependent variable is the next year's injury rate with days away from work (DAFWII), which is the number of injuries and illnesses with days away from work divided by the number of hours worked by all employees in a given establishment-year, then multiplied by 200,000. We include all the firm-and establishment-specific variables as those in Table 2 , however not report below for brevity. Definitions of all other variables are in the Appendix 1. P-values based on robust standard errors clustered at firm level are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
